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Abstract 
The article analyzes the socio-economic consequences of the armed conflict for the economic development of 
the ATO regions. The key problems related to the temporarily occupied territories were identified, the directions 
of their solution and the role that impact investment can play in this were specified. A dynamic analysis of 
indicators of socio-economic development of Ukrainian economy as a whole and in the regional context for the 
period from 2012 to 2019 was conducted. It is determined that the loss of territorial control has led to a significant 
deterioration of the economy in Ukraine; the assessment of losses of economic potential at the anti-terrorist 
operation zone was carried out. The social component of this issue is analyzed separately, namely, how the 
conflict affected the population, the loss of human capital, in particular due to mass displacement. These include 
human losses, forced displacement, destruction of physical infrastructure, disruption of so-called soft economic 
infrastructure (for example, existing links between sellers and consumers). Given the scale of losses and 
consequences, we can talk about a wide range of areas for impact investment, related to economic recovery in 
post-conflict regions. The article presents a list of steps to restore the occupied territories, which can be translated 
into the plane of solving socio-economic problems, as well as an assessment of the overall needs for the 
restoration of government-controlled areas of the ATO. This allowed us to conclude that the restoration of 
infrastructure is one of the most promising areas for attracting investment and implementing impact investment. 
However, a study of this area for investment revealed that not all areas will be cost-effective and attractive to 
investors. Therefore, the direction of impact investments immediately after the political settlement of the conflict 
in Donbass in infrastructure should be expected only in the field of telecommunications. Other sectors will 
receive private investment only after a few years of stability, so only public financial support and public 
investment policy should be considered a key source of funding. 
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Introduction  
The situation around the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea remains difficult. The conflict resolution is in the realm of politics and military operations. 
The consequences and timing of their return are uncertain. The loss of territory and military conflict have affected 
many economic indicators, leading to new problems and challenges that the country has not dealt with before. 
The most important are the resettlement of citizens of Ukraine from the temporarily occupied territories, 
promoting their reintegration into socio-economic life, reorientation of export-import activities, restoration of 
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economic development, infrastructure, social sphere and more. Thus, the aim of the article is to analyze the 
consequences of the military conflict for the country and the need for post-conflict reconstruction. 
Literature review 
This topic has been studied by both foreign and domestic scientists. Thus, in the works of Paul Collier, Bello 
Walden, Cedric de Coning, Tim Murithi, the main goal is to find rational approaches and methods to overcome 
the consequences of economic nature for the economy of the country. Also their work on peacebuilding in post-
conflict regions is important, which highlights the main problems and ways to solve them in different scenarios 
of sustainable development. 
It should be noted that domestic scientists in the study of the recovery of the post-conflict economy are mainly 
divided into three areas. The first is a study in the field of banking and insurance. Such scientists include M.M. 
Alexandrova (2011), О.О. Reznikov (2001), O.V. Kozmenko (1998), L.S. Koval (1998), A.V. Koldovskyi 
(2013), I.I. Strelchenko (2009), K. Pajak et al. (2016). The second direction is taxation, budget and investment, 
the supporters of which are M.O. Matukhno (2015), I.G. Lukyanenko (2005), A.O. Nikitishin (2009), R.Yu. 
Paslavska (2014). Representatives of the third direction, namely accounting and control at all state at the 
commercial levels of development of the country are N.G. Vyhovska (2010), I.K. Drozd (2006), V.V. 
Evdokymov (2011), V. Lyashenko & I. Pidorycheva (2019), L.M. Kindratska (2002), A. Kuzior & P. Kuzior 
(2020), A. Kwilinski (2018), A. Kwilinski et al. (2019a; 2019b), A. Kuzior & J. Zozuľak (2019). V. 
Kondratenko et al. (2020), A. Kwilinski & A. Kuzior (2020), L. Mikhnevych et al. (2020).  Given the large 
number of studies that reveal the essence of post-conflict recovery, there is a need to analyze the current state of 
the economy and the consequences of military conflict in terms of national development. 
Results 
When studying the state of the national economy and changes in economic indicators, we should first pay 
attention to the changes that have taken place in recent years in Ukraine, identify key issues related to the 
temporarily occupied territories, specify their solutions and the role that can play an impact investing in it. 
Let’s analyze the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators for the last 8 years in 2012-2019 (see Table 1). If you 
look at the dynamics of GDP in nominal terms, the situation looks quite optimistic. The smallest increase is 
observed in 2013-2014 and it is about 4% and more than 20% in subsequent years, except for 2019, when it 
reached 11.6%. For a more objective assessment, the index of the physical volume of GDP to the previous year 
is suitable, according to which we can see the real consequences of the military conflict. In 2014, we managed 
to reach only 93.4% of the previous year’s volume, and in 2015 this figure was 90.2%. In the following years, 
although it increased (the figure was in the range of 102.4-103.4% in 2016-2019), but the economy did not 
recover to the level of 2012-2013. These processes are accompanied by significant levels of the consumer price 
index for goods and services 124.9 and 143.3 in 2014 and 2015, respectively. In the future, its values remained 
high with relative normalization only at the end of 2019 (104.1). The level of the unemployed population also 
increased from 7.2% in 2013 to 8.8-9.5% in 2014-2018, i.e. the difference ranges from 1/4 to 1/3 of the  figure 
in 2013. Revenues and expenditures of the consolidated budget of Ukraine change sharply after 2014. A one-
time increase of 43% and 30%, respectively, next year with their further growth at a slightly slower pace due to 
high inflation and the need to finance defense spending. 
Table 1. Indicators of economic development of Ukraine in 2012-2019 
Indicator 2012 2013 2014 1 2015 1 2016 1 2017 1 2018 1 2019 1 
Gross domestic product, UAH million 1 459 096 1 522 657 1 586 915 1 988 544 2 385 367 2 983 882 3 560 596 3 974 564 
GDP growth rate, % 12.2 4.4 4.2 25.3 20.0 25.1 19.3 11.6 
Index of physical volume of GDP to the previous year, % 100.2 100.0 93.4 90.2 102.4 102.5 103.4 103.2 
Consumer price index for goods and services, % 99.8 100.5 124.9 143.3 112.4 113.7 109.8 104.1 
Unemployment rate, % 7.5 7.2 9.3 9.1 9.3 9.5 8.8 8.2 
Capital investments, UAH million 273 256 249 873 219 420 273 116 359 216 448 462 578 726 623 979 
Consolidated budget revenues, UAH million 445 525 442 789 456 067 652 031 782 859 1 016 970 1 184 291 1 289 849 
Consolidated budget expenditures, UAH million 492 455 505 844 523 126 679 871 835 832 1 056 973 1 250 190 1 372 351 
Consolidated budget deficit, UAH million -46 929 -63 055 -67 058 -27 840 -52 973 -40 004 -65 899 -82 501 
in% of GDP 3.22 4.14 4.23 1.40 2.22 1.34 1.8% 2.08 
Volume of sold construction products, UAH million 142 948 131 548 147 344 133 450 160 647 215 100 294 543 364 056 
Retail trade turnover, UAH million 812 052 888 773 901 924 1 031 679 1 175 319 815 344 930 629 1 094 046 
Notes: 1 Excluding the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and part of the 
temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 
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Table 2. Indicators of regional development of Ukraine in 2012-2019 
Indicator 2012 2013 2014 1 2015 1 2016 1 2017 1 2018 1 2019 1 
Gross regional 
product, UAH million, 
including 
1 459 096 1 522 657 1 586 915 1 988 544 2 385 367 2 983 882 3 560 596 3 974 564 
Donetsk oblast 170 775 164 926 119 983 115 012 137 500 166 404 192 256 n / a 
% of GDP 11.7% 10.8% 7.6% 5.8% 5.8% 5.6% 5.4% n / a 
Luhansk oblast 58 767 55 108 31 393 23 849 31 356 30 285 35 206 n / a 
% of GDP 4.0% 3.6% 2.0% 1.2% 1.3% 1.0% 1.0% n / a 
Volume of sold 
industrial products 
(goods, services),  
UAH million, incl. 
1 367 926 1 322 408 1 428 839 1 776 604 2 158 030 2 625 863 3 045 202 2 938 831 
Donetsk oblast 242 229 220 640 181 385 190 727 212 098 266 626 322 988 283 946 
Luhansk oblast 84 460 72 657 39 401 23 866 37 698 24 473 24 136 21 908 
gricultural products 
(at constant prices in 
2016), UAH million, 
incl. 
539 991 613 429 626 925 596 833 634 433 620 476 671 294 680 982 
Donetsk oblast 26 154 27 587 25 679 16 644 18 006 18 422 16 662 20 261 
Luhansk oblast 16 116 16 630 13 282 10 320 12 299 11 573 12 628 14 448 
Regional volumes of foreign trade in goods, thousand dollars USA     
Export 68 809 811 63 312 022 53 901 689 38 127 150 36 361 711 43 264 736 47 334 987 50 054 606 
Donetsk oblast 14 127 179 12 408 183 8 402 968 3 695 324 3 430 784 4 432 600 4 845 441 4 631 583 
Luhansk oblast 4 192 709 3 544 015 1 902 640 257 772 435 727 233 905 202 921 152 851 
Import 84 658 060 76 963 965 54 428 717 37 516 443 39 249 797 49 607 174 57 187 578 60 800 173 
Donetsk oblast 4 168 469 4 053 798 2 122 395 1 202 633 1 110 777 2 033 912 2 247 214 2 224 442 
Luhansk oblast 1 989 589 1 849 914 1 017 230 318 426 357 396 273 152 285 036 252 961 
Number of active 
enterprises 622 538 669 993 631 184 624 769 605 851 640 545 666 986 697 282 
Donetsk oblast 46 211 48 580 47 389 31 820 31 437 30 738 30 720 31 481 
Luhansk oblast 20 242 21 797 21 618 13 891 14 204 13 805 14 010 14 347 
Notes: 1 Excluding the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and part of the 
temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 
Table 3. The contribution of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the main sectors of the economy, the share in the 
relevant indicator before the conflict and now 
Indicator 
Donetsk oblast Luhansk oblast Total Change of indicator 
2013 2019  2013  2019  2013 2019  2013 2019  
Workforce 9.7% 4.8% 4.9% 2.0% 14.6% 6.8% -7.9% -53.8% 
Number of employees in enterprises 11.6% 4.4% 4.5% 1.1% 16.1% 5.5% -10.6% -65.9% 
Incomes of the population 10.7% 5.3% 4.6% 1.8% 15.4% 7.1% -8.2% -53.6% 
Expenditures of the population 9.8% 3.5% 4.3% 1.3% 14.0% 4.8% -9.3% -65.9% 
Gross regional product 10.8% 3.6% 5.4% 1.0% 16.2% 4.6% -11.6% -71.6% 
Volume of sold industrial products (goods, 
services) 
16.7% 9.7% 5.5% 0.7% 22.2% 10.4% -11.8% -53.1% 
Agricultural products 4.5% 3.0% 2.7% 2.1% 7.2% 5.1% -2.1% -29.3% 
The volume of construction work performed 12.9% 3.8% 2.7% 0.4% 15.7% 4.2% -11.4% -73.1% 
Capital investments 11.2% 4.9% 4.6% 0.5% 15.7% 5.4% -10.3% -65.4% 
Export 19.60% 9.25% 5.60% 0.31% 25.2% 9.6% -15.6% -62.1% 
Imports 5.27% 3.66% 2.40% 0.42% 7.7% 4.1% -3.6% -46.9% 
Number of active enterprises 7.3% 4.5% 3.3% 2.1% 10.5% 6.6% -3.9% -37.4% 
Notes: Data for 2019 are given without taking into account the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the 
city of Sevastopol and part of the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 
The reaction to the aggravation of the situation around the military conflict is the volume of sold construction 
products, which in 2015 decreased by 9.5% compared to the previous year, although in the future we see its 
significant growth at a rate of 20-37%. 
Retail trade turnover grew by about 10% until 2016, after which we see its decline by almost a third, which to 
some extent goes beyond the general trends of other economic indicators. However, in our opinion, the reasons 
for the changes are similar only with a certain time lag. 
Thus, the conclusion is obvious:the loss of territorial control has led to a significant deterioration of Ukrainian 
economy. The concretization of the consequences around the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and 
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Luhansk oblasts should be accompanied by an additional analysis of individual indicators of this region (see 
Table 2). This allows you to get an approximate estimate of the loss of economic potential in the region. 
First, a key indicator of significant losses is the reduction in gross regional product. As noted earlier, Ukrainian 
GDP grows in nominal terms, including due to high inflation. At the same time, we observe a decrease in the 
regional product for three years in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in a row – 2013-15. And when in 2013 this 
decrease was insignificant 3.4% in Donetsk and 6.2% in Luhansk oblasts, already in the following years, 
volumes fell by 27.3% and 43.0% in 2014 and by 4.1% and 24.0%, respectively. As a result, the share of Donetsk 
oblast in the GDP of Ukraine decreases from 11-12% to 5.5%, i.e. 2 times. Luhansk oblast has lost even more. 
The share is reduced by 4% to only 1%.  
There is a decline in sales of industrial products. The gross volume of the indicator grows in Ukraine, while it 
decreases in the occupied regions. In 2013-14, the decrease in volumes in Donetsk oblast was 9% and 18%, 
respectively, after which there was a recovery. But the share of the region in total sales falls from 18% to 9%. 
At the same time, Luhansk oblast loses even more: 14% and 46% of the indicator in the respective years, but the 
decline continues in the future (except 2016): 39.4% in 2015, 35.1% in 2017. As a result, the share of the region 
in this indicator decreases from 6% to 0.7%, more than 8 times. 
The reasons are obvious: a significant number of industrial enterprises remained in the occupied territories. In 
particular, in Luhansk oblast budget-generating enterprises of the metallurgical industry were PJSC “Alchevsk 
Metallurgical Plant”, PJSC “Stakhanov Ferroalloy Plant”, PJSC “Lugansk Pipe Plant”, Lutugino State Research 
and Production Rolling Mill, LLC “Metals and Polymers”, machine-building enterprises PJSC “Stakhanov 
Carriage Plant”, PJSC “Luganskteplovoz”, PJSC “NVC “Transmash”, TDV “Popasnyansky Car Repair Plant”, 
etc. In Donetsk oblast, the Donetsk, Yenakiyevo and Makiivka metallurgical plants, the Donetsk 
Electrometallurgical Plant, the Yenakiyevo Coke Plant, and the Makiivka Coke Plant should be distinguished. 
In 2013, the mines in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts provided 76% of coal production in Ukraine. Already in 
2014, Ukraine lost control over the main coal mining areas of both regions. The Ministry of Energy and Coal of 
Ukraine states that there are 97 mines left in the occupied part of the region (55 in Donetsk oblast, 42 in Luhansk 
oblast). 
Agricultural products are not the main contribution of the occupied region to its total volume in the country. In 
2012, both oblasts accounted for 7.8%. After 2015, it exceeded 5% only in 2019. A significant decline was 
recorded again in 2015: 35.2% in Donetsk oblast and 22.3% in Luhansk oblast. 
The analysis of regional volumes of foreign trade shows that both regions rapidly lose their entire export 
orientation. Back in 2012, Donetsk region accounted for more than 20%, and Luhansk more than 6% of export 
revenues from foreign trade in goods, and three years later we see a complete collapse: less than 10% in Donetsk 
and less than 1% in Lugansk oblast. The value of imported products is much lower, but even here the share of 
Donetsk oblast falls from 5% to less than 4%, and Luhansk – from 2.5% to 0.5%. 
The number of active enterprises in both regions falls by a third when comparing 2015 with 2014. After that, a 
significant increase in newly created businesses is not observed, while in the country as a whole the number 
gradually increases. 
Separately, we will analyze how the conflict affected the population. Thus, according to the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Consolidated Report of the EU, the UN and the World Bank 
Group, 2015), the quantitative casualties among the civilian population during the entire conflict are 3,052. 
Given the 298 deaths aboard Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, the figure is 3,350. Estimates of the number of 
injured are only approximate and, according to the UN, are more than 7,000 people. The total number of victims, 
including servicemen, is 41-44 thousand, of which 13-13.2 thousand are dead and 29-31 thousand are wounded 
on both sides of the conflict. 
The hostilities led to mass displacement. Accounting for internally displaced persons and providing 
them.assistance is provided by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine (the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
Ukraine, 2014). At the end of 2014, 633,523 internally displaced persons were registered. The following year, 
the number increased 2.5 times. The peak value reached 1.7 million people and currently (June, 2020) is almost 
1.45 million people. 
Thus, the key problems that exist in the occupied territories are as follows: 
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➢ declining incomes, poverty; 
➢ deterioration of the demographic situation; 
➢ changes in the economic structure; 
➢ significant economic losses; 
➢ reduction of production volumes in heavy industries; 
➢ damage / loss of infrastructure; 
➢ reduction of trade, including foreign economic relations; 
➢ losses in the social security system, including significant support costs for internally displaced persons; 
➢ loss of public confidence, including through massive propaganda by the Russian Federation in the media. 
As a result, military conflicts lead to losses that are not always accurately estimated: human losses, forced 
displacement, destruction of physical infrastructure, disruption of so-called soft economic infrastructure (for 
example, existing links between sellers and consumers). As a result, the population loses or has limited access 
to basic services (water, electricity) and social services. Jobs and production assets are destroyed, and with them 
sources of income. They experience loss of knowledge and expertise in many areas due to the death of people 
and their forced relocation. The incidence of the most vulnerable segments of the population is increasing: 
women, children, youth, and people with disabilities. In conflict-affected regions, the local economy is 
weakening and the most affected are becoming dependent on humanitarian assistance. Circulation of goods is 
limited, both due to damage to physical infrastructure and disruptions in supply chains. The purchasing power 
of citizens is significantly reduced as a result of loss of sources of income. Mass displacement of persons leads 
to the leaching of skilled labor. Under such conditions, local markets almost cease to operate. Most of the 
negative effects are interconnected and only reinforce each other (see Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1. Causal changes in the economy of post-conflict areas 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
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So we can talk about a wide range of areas for impact investment related to economic recovery in post-conflict 
regions. In our view, the socio-economic integration of those affected by the conflict is a priority and is based 
on the ability of the local economy to create new jobs. After years of conflict, the potential of the local economy 
becomes incapable of self-recovery and therefore needs external assistance in most cases due to declining 
purchasing power, destruction of economic ties between economic entities, loss of productive assets, inadequate 
infrastructure, significant risks, instability (and often , lack) of investment flows. In this regard, the funds should 
be used to reactivate the local economy, mobilize investment resources. Financial support (according to the 
World Bank, 2019) can be obtained from various sources, including the following: 
➢ budget funding from the government; 
➢ direct budget support from international partners; 
➢ concentration of grant funding through the Trust Fund with many partners; 
➢ international loans; 
➢ support of the financial sector in the form of participation in specialized instruments and guarantees; 
➢ mechanisms to facilitate coordination with private sector investment. 
At the same time, in the short term, the assistance is mainly aimed at the gradual elimination of dependence on 
external sources of funding through the formation of temporary jobs and conditions for income generation. In 
the long run, internal conditions should be created for the recovery of the local economy and the creation of new 
permanent jobs. 
But any economic recovery begins with the initial stage – peace negotiations. This makes it possible to 
implement any plans and projects in the conflict. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine has formed the 
Donbass Deoccupation Plan “Small Steps Mechanism”, the strategic task of which is to “restore the country’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, deoccupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories”. The 
plan includes 11 steps (the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, 2014): 
1. A separate region (district) of the occupied territories of Donbass is selected and agreed upon, where 
opposing military formations are diverted beyond the agreed line – a demilitarized security zone is created. 
2. The Special International Peacekeeping Mission and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine shall take 
control of the specified part of the territory and its borders. 
3. Within the limits of the liberated territory, the forces of the bodies of justice of Ukraine shall prepare for the 
election process and the subsequent holding of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation. 
4. The work of all state institutions and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine shall be resumed on the territory 
of the reintegrated site. 
5. The reintegration process begins. 
6. The procedure of humanitarian demining of the previously occupied territory is carried out. 
7. Immediate work is carried out to eliminate man-made and environmental risks. 
8. An urgent program to verify and restore Ukrainian documents is launched for all people who have lived in 
the occupied territories these years. 
9. A program to restore infrastructure and the economy is launched. 
10. Work is under way to return internally displaced persons. 
11. Participation of citizens living in the formerly occupied territories in elections to the central authorities of 
Ukraine is restored. 
After these steps, the restoration of the occupied territories can be translated into solving socio-economic 
problems and should include the following stages: 
➢ stabilization, which should cover the target groups of the population that have suffered the greatest losses 
from the conflict; 
➢ reintegration, which connects the development of local communities; 
➢ transition to sustainable development, which provides for the final integration of the region into the 
national economy. 
Promoting economic development and employment can be achieved through a large number of programs and 
approaches that differ in their goals, instruments, sectoral focus and timeframe. The type of support should be 
selected on the basis of a thorough analysis of the local context and its specifics, as there are many examples of 
negative consequences and lost opportunities arising from insufficient consideration of local characteristics. In 
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addition, it is necessary to ensure the compatibility of short-term and long-term benefits that are complementary. 
In many cases, projects aimed at concrete immediate results (e.g. public works programs) may have the 
consequences necessary for peace stability. Similarly, projects aimed at long-term goals (for example, 
stimulating industrial relations) have a significant impact on the realities after the conflict period. It is desirable 
to start with existing activities, skills, structures and systems, and not to impose ready-made and overly ambitious 
solutions. In many cases, the application of such an approach will lead to completely different results insufficient 
to achieve the ambitious goals of sustainable development. This includes maximizing the use of local labor and 
resources, as well as identifying and strengthening existing or potential cross-sectoral linkages at the local level. 
Post-conflict recovery is faster with the support of local participants, as it is an incentive for them to achieve 
long-term economic development results. However, as a rule, these local efforts are not enough to meet the needs 
and solve all the problems on the ground. Development assistance remains necessary, but it must use, develop 
and remove barriers for local stakeholders. If development support considers local conditions and specifics, 
builds and strengthens local capacity in the long run, the project will have a high probability of achieving positive 
results, which will be maintained with the reduction of external assistance. This involves using and strengthening 
local skills, manpower and connections to stimulate knowledge and capital accumulation. In 2015, a joint effort 
of the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank Group assessed the investment needed to rebuild 
the affected regions as part of a program to assess ways to restore and build peace in Eastern Ukraine (see Table 
4). The assessment itself concerned only the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine. Losses in the 
occupied territories are currently not even approximate and require independent on-site analysis. As noted 
earlier, currently it is impossible to say the prospects for resolving the problem of returning these territories to 
the control of the Ukrainian authorities. This makes it impossible to specify the areas of impact investment. 
Table 4. Estimation of aggregate needs for restoration of government-controlled territories of Eastern Ukraine, 
mln. USA 
Areas of financial assistance Sum 
Infrastructure and social services 1 257,7 
Healthcare 184.2 
Education 9.7 
Social assistance 329.4 
Energy 78.9 
Transport 558.2 
Water supply and drainage 40.1 
Environment 30.0 
Public buildings and housing 27.2 
Economic recovery 135,5 
Employment 40.0 
Productive forces and means of subsistence 33.0 
Economic planning at the local level 7.5 
SMEs and the private sector 30.0 
Financial services 25.0 
Social sustainability, peacebuilding and public safety 126.8 
Understanding vulnerability, risk and social cohesion 2.5 
Promoting social cohesion and building trust 19.7 
Promoting a culture of tolerance through dialogue 11.4 
Protection of the population affected by the conflict 5.8 
Improving access to justice 8.1 
Providing legal assistance 6.6 
Psychosocial support 28.4 
Restoration of public safety 23.9 
Preparation for DDR 20.4 
Total 1 520,0 
Source: compiled by authors. 
In general, infrastructure rehabilitation is considered a primary area of investment in post-conflict areas. For 
example, a study by J. Schwartz and P. Halkyard (Schwartz, Jordan; Halkyard, Pablo, 2006) shows that 
immediately after the political phase of a peaceful settlement, the post-conflict region / country attracts the 
attention of international investors who provide the necessary reconstruction assistance to local economy. In the 
first years, investment volumes are usually significant (up to 20% of GDP) with a gradual decline after 7-8 years 
(less than 5% of GDP). But even at the initial stage (the first year of recovery), most regions have political and 
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administrative problems, which limit the opportunities for efficient use of investment. That is why at the initial 
stage the most important source of assistance is the state budget. The initial period of economic growth and 
financial assistance is accompanied only by moderate activity of private investors in the field of infrastructure. 
Significant private investment support materializes only after stability has been maintained in the region for a 
certain (sometimes long) period. At the same time, moderate investments come almost immediately. Private 
investment in infrastructure follows a clear sequence of selection of areas of interest, where mobile 
communications are the primary source of interest immediately after the end of the conflict (see Figure 2). The 
desire of mobile operators to invest in conditions of ultra-high risk is due to the rapid return on investment. Other 
areas are not of significant interest in the initial period. Energy projects remain somewhat attractive, especially 
three years after the conflict, and the frequency of investment increases after five years. 
 
Figure 2. Number of infrastructure investment projects by sector (vertical scale) in post-conflict 
countries, which were financed by private investment in the years after the achievement of peace 
(horizontal scale) 
Source: compiled by Schwartz, Jordan; Halkyard, Pablo (2006). 
Transport infrastructure mainly attracts private investment in the development of seaports, probably because 
container terminals offer the opportunity to earn hard currency and because fixed assets can be integrated into 
vertically integrated logistics systems. Investments in railways, roads and airports usually take place only a 
few years after the conflict. The water supply sector receives the least investment, although in terms of meeting 
the basic needs of the population, this area has a high priority. 
Conclusions, discussions and recommendations 
Thus, it can be argued that the consequences of the military intervention of the Russian Federation have 
significantly affected the economic performance of Ukraine. The annexation of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea and the resolution of the conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts led to a fall in GDP, rising inflation, 
and unemployment. The economy of Donbass is largely excluded from the general economic space of 
Ukraine. The data in Table 3 summarize the negative impact of the conflict. Most indicators decreased by 2-
4 times between 2013 and 2019. Thus, we conclude that the focus of impact investments immediately after 
the political settlement of the conflict in Donbass on infrastructure should be expected only in 
telecommunications. Other sectors will receive private investment only after a few years of stability, so only 
public financial support should be considered a key source of funding. That is why, in our opinion, although 
investments in infrastructure are desirable, but their involvement in the first years of economic recovery in 
the region seems unpromising. 
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